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Belief in change:  the role of media and communications in driving action on climate 
change  
Abstract:  Climate change is a collective action problem as much as it is a physical one, 
however, in spite of high levels of awareness and a broad acceptance of the science, there has 
been no public consensus on the need to prioritise action.  This chapter explores the role of 
current communications processes in inhibiting the development of such public sentiment.  It 
draws on a circuits of communications framework which addresses production processes, and 
the structures which underpin them, patterns in media content and how audiences receive 
media messages, including online interactions.  It will argue that these have operated to shift 
political priorities and foster feelings of powerlessness whilst in fact collectively publics can 
play a crucial role in shifting the parameters of the debate.    
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Introduction  
Climate change is a collective action problem as much as a physical one and, as such, a 
necessary precondition for tackling it is some level of public consensus on the urgency of 
doing so.  Despite a general level of concern and awareness however there has been no 
sustained and effective public demand for governments to act.  That the media do not simply 
reflect what is going on in society is widely recognised by media researchers; however the 
degree to which media representations may be implicating in driving social action is much 
disputed (Curran 2002; Castells 2010; Happer and Philo 2013, Philo et al. 2015).  On an issue 
such as climate change, which is rooted in a complex science that most people do not easily 
understand or have direct experience of, the media play a key role in communicating and 
interpreting the causes, threats and potential solutions (Boykoff and Yulsman 2013).  These 
interpretations are founded on broader assumptions about societal priorities and the most 
effective ways to bring about social change which are in circulation at any time. This chapter 
begins with a discussion of the communications processes across the social, political and 
corporate spheres that shape the range of perspectives that get heard.  Drawing on a series of 
recent British empirical studies, it then explores the way in which these perspectives are 
accepted or challenged – and argues that these responses have decisive implications for 
promoting (or inhibiting) the action that is becoming increasingly urgent on climate change.  
Neoliberalism and the ‘climate mismatch’ 
Naomi Klein has talked of ‘our climate change mismatch’ – that the collective action required 
to mitigate against climate change is out of step with the economic and cultural priorities of 
the era.  The context for this is the movement of Western societies towards a model of 
‘neoliberalism’ over the last three decades.  A term much in dispute (Venugopal 2015), it 
variously refers to an ideology, a system or set of policies in practice and/or a period such an 
era of capitalism (Fine, 2013; Davidson 2015). These elements are dynamic and inconsistent 
(Fine 2013).  Central to this inconsistency is that, while theoretically neoliberalism involves 
the promotion of ‘free markets’, in practice it has led to the increased state intervention in the 
marketplace to redirect power to large global corporations (Miller 2010; Miller 2015; Philo et 
al. 2015).  Previously publicly owned institutions are increasingly transferred to the private 
sector and the greatly expanded financial markets, and the profit imperative progressively 
eats into almost every area of social life (Fine and Hall 2012).  Corporations feed into 
decisions which affect the public directly and, as a result, collective solutions to public issues 
are marginalised in favour of corporate solutions (Dinan and Miller 2007; Miller and Dinan 
2015).  The public are increasingly reconfigured as consumers in their engagement with 
issues such as education, health and the environment (Devereux 2014) 
This structural shift in power relations must also be understood in the context of a shift in the 
‘communicative processes’ which support these changes.  To understand this better  it is 
useful to draw on a ‘circuits of communication’ framework which theorises social change as 
a product of the interactive elements and processes which construct the range of perspectives, 
and related actions, which might be considered (Miller and Dinan 2015; Philo et al. 2015).  
These elements include;  the suppliers of information such as elite speakers and politicians, 
and the groups who have access to them including corporate actors and advocacy groups;  the 
nature and volume of media content;  how audiences respond to media content; and any 
decisive outcomes such as policy-making and other forms of collective action.  Crucially all 
of these elements interact and they are not mutually exclusive so, for example, politicians 
supply information to the mainstream media but they also take into account their beliefs 
about how audiences respond to decisions that they make.  After all, politicians are ultimately 
answerable to electoral support.  Within the circuits model, digital media play a dual and 
often oppositional role; in that they construct ‘audiences simultaneously as media consumers 
and media producers, allowing for a more interactive level of response whilst also supporting 
a parallel flow of information that interacts with mainstream media’ (Philo et al 2015: 446).  
Audiences can publicly scrutinise and challenge the messages of mainstream media by 
drawing on their ‘collective intelligence’ through, for example, the use of social media 
channels such as Facebook and Twitter, and this can be seen as an alternative form of media 
power (Jenkins 2006).   However, this is accompanied by ‘media convergence’, a key aspect 
of which is the consolidation of media ownership across platforms that tends to reinforce the 
increasingly narrow range of perspectives that audiences have to choose from.  Miller and 
Dinan (2015) have charted the increased opportunities for corporate PR and lobby groups 
under neoliberalism to dominate these increasingly integrated ‘communicative processes’ as 
they move deeper and deeper into social and political institutions.  In one sense, their 
activities are not transparent to the public as they deal directly with decision-makers – what 
Miller calls the ‘short circuit’ – but corporate PR agencies also have a public platform in that 
they feed directly into both traditional (and therefore digital) media content in systematic and 
unprecedented ways.   
The degree to which action on climate change will be prioritised therefore can be seen as the 
product of a constant and evolving struggle between different forces.  The impact of the 
financial crash in 2008 is instructive in this respect.  The period preceding the crash was a 
progressive time for public debate on climate change.   Al Gore’s documentary An 
Inconvenient Truth, was released in 2006 just one year before the landmark Fourth 
Assessment Report of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) of 2007 opening up voluminous and broadly positive media and political attention 
across the Western world (Philo and Happer 2013). The then New Labour government in the 
UK, whilst rooted in free market ideology, strongly promoted its socially democratic 
principles of which climate change action was a key aspect.  Significantly this was largely 
supported by a Conservative opposition out of office for nearly a decade and keen to 
modernise under new leader David Cameron.  This period culminated in the passing of the 
ambitious UK Climate Change Act in 2008.    
If some predicted that the financial crash of the same year would bring about the end of 
neoliberalism, the evidence suggests it cemented structural and ideological processes integral 
to it further (Berry 2015; Philo et al. 2015).  In spite of intense public anger at the actions of 
those in the finance industry, the political and media debate demonstrated a systematic 
absence of any effective challenge to the prevailing economic system (Berry 2012, 2015; 
Philo 2012; Happer and Philo 2013).  Collective solutions such as state intervention in the 
banks were marginalised, and austerity was presented as as ‘common sense as a well-
managed household avoiding the accumulation of unnecessary unsecured debt’ (Stanley 
2014: 905). The broad political consensus on the need to reduce the deficit via spending cuts 
ushered in a coalition government led by the Conservatives which, from the point of taking 
office, consistently stated that the urgent priority was tackling the debt while promoting 
economic recovery.  As to the question of the positioning of environmental action and carbon 
reduction strategies in relation to this top priority, at the Conservative Party Conference in 
October 2011, one year into office, Chancellor Osborne stated that ‘We’re not going to save 
the planet by putting our country out of business.’   
Returning to the ‘short-circuit’ of communications, there is some indication that this shift in 
rhetoric has been paralleled by a growth in the efforts of contrarian think tanks since 2006 
which aim to ‘dominate the information environment in a number of distinct private and 
public arenas’ (Miller and Dinan 2015: 98).  In 2013, the Guardian revealed that secretive 
trusts linked to wealthy US and UK corporations funded large numbers of organisations 
which either operated to systematically discredit climate science or downplay the need to take 
action (Goldenberg, 2013; Miller and Dinan 2015). A key dimension of the strategy is of elite 
planning groups and think tanks inputting directly into governmental decision-making.  In 
2012, evidence shows that the Chancellor met with representatives from Centrica, Exxon and 
other oil and gas industry groups for undisclosed ‘general discussions’ at least once a month 
(Hickman 2012).  This compared with not a single meeting with personnel from the green 
energy industry in the same period.  Meanwhile, in spite of climate and energy policy 
objectives remaining formally in place, the promotion of, for example, the further use of 
fossil fuels through ‘fracking’ and other market based ‘solutions’ indicated a general watering 
down of the Climate Change Act’s targets.   In spite of claims in 2006 by David Cameron to 
form the ‘greenest government ever, by 2015, at the launch of the Conservative party’s 
manifesto, climate change wasn’t mentioned once. 
Mainstream and digital media debates 
The political debate directly impacts upon mainstream media coverage as there is a 
continuing reliance upon a restricted range of elite sources of which politicians are the most 
significant due to their authority status and direct access to policy making (Wahl-Jorgensen 
2013; Lupien 2013).  However the media do not simply reflect the movements and interests 
of political parties – the shape that content takes is the product of a range of competing 
interests.  Journalists are subject to a range of pressures including ownership, editorial and 
financial interests but ultimately the need to deliver audiences (Herman and Chomsky 1988; 
Philo et al. 2015). However, a further factor is the norms and ethics of journalism, such as 
adherence to balance and neutrality, and the need to challenge decision-making (Boykoff and 
Boykoff 2004, 2007; Guerrera 2009; Tambini 2010).  Even journalists operating in the most 
constrained organisational structures need to feature a wider range of views.   Audiences 
expect the political decision-making process to be scrutinised, and the media respond to this.  
However a central criticism of the reporting of climate change in the English-speaking media 
has been the way in which these norms, primarily the aim of ‘balanced’ reporting, have given 
disproportionate space to climate sceptics (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004, 2007; Painter 2011).  
Some of these are part of the powerful and well-resourced groups operating to undermine the 
science and de-prioritise it as part of the wider climate contrarian movement.  A UK-based 
group, The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), for example, has regular representatives on 
the BBC (Monbiot, 2013), including appearances on the corporation’s flagship current affairs 
programme, Question Time. The claims of the contrarians do not go unchallenged; there are a 
range of speakers including representatives of advocacy groups as well as those from the 
mainstream of the political spectrum.  But these sceptical views do not struggle to get heard.    
In the context of growing certainty about the science but reduced political priority, there has 
been recent concerted efforts by the scientific community to shape reporting of the science.  
When the IPCC, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, released its fifth 
Assessment Report (AR5) in 2013/14, the largest and most detailed summary of the science 
to date, it had a very clear communications strategy.  These comments by one of the report’s 
lead authors prior to the launch illuminate the approach: 
Climate change is really a challenge in managing risks. And it's not that we're talking 
about identifying particular things that're going to happen in a particular place, at a 
particular time. (Painter, 2014) 
Research on the TV coverage (Painter 2014) showed that the IPCC was successful in having 
genuine scientists lead the debate; IPCC authors and other scientists were almost exclusively 
the interviewees who appeared on screen during coverage of the report.  However, they were 
less successful in reframing the debate; instead of the language of risk, uncertainty and 
opportunity, the disaster frame dominated reporting (Painter 2014).  A critical point is the 
degree to which contrarian speakers can effectively challenge the disaster narrative.  The 
disproportionate air-time given to Professor of Economics, Richard Tol - one of many 
hundreds of IPCC contributors - who announced he wanted his name removed from the 
report stating he was unhappy with the final draft’s tendency to be “alarmist’ suggests that it 
allows for the conventional ‘balanced’ approach (Happer 2014) – which perhaps the IPCC’s 
preferred framing of risk does not quite so easily.  The disaster frame (and response) also 
meets with broadcasters’ ultimate objectives of engaging with audiences providing a sense of 
conflict and drama to an otherwise quite dry scientific report.    
Digital media potentially offers collective ways of challenging mainstream messages.  New 
media scholars argue that the emergence of digital news, and the increasing use of social 
media, has led to a shift in the relationship between mainstream journalism and audiences 
which ultimately poses a threat to the ‘authority’ of the former (Robinson 2010; Rosen 2012; 
Siapera 2011).  An element of this is the way in which audience response via blogs, social 
media or online comments can ‘fact-check’ the perspectives promoted in the mainstream 
(Jenkins 2006; Robinson 2010; Marchionni, 2013).  Misleading information can be 
discredited at a much faster pace by activists and experts (professional or otherwise) 
operating online drawing on their ‘collective intelligence’ (Jenkins 2006).  As illustration, in 
2013, an interview on the Sunday Politics with then Liberal Democrat Secretary of State for 
Energy and Climate Change, was met with immediate and voluminous accusations on Twitter 
over a number of factual inaccuracies on climate science.  The programme’s presenter, 
Andrew Neill, defended himself against what he described as the ‘climate mafia’, a term 
which indicates at least some shift in media power.  However, the degree to which there has 
been a genuine challenge to the power of mainstream media, and the power relations which 
lie behind them, is as yet unproven. A key aspect of media power, which the example shows, 
is the ability to focus attention upon particular areas – on Twitter, in line with the TV 
broadcast, the focus was the dispute between different factions over climate science, and 
away from the more important issues of the action that urgently needs to be taken.  If the 
battleground is the ability to shape public debate, this represents a wider trend demonstrated 
by research that Twitter follows the mainstream media agenda rather than the other way 
around (Newman 2011).  In fact an equal if not greater problem than the conflicted nature of 
reporting in recent years has been the inconsistent level of global coverage (Fischer, 2011; 
2015).  Since 2009, when climate change coverage reached a peak with the UN climate 
change summit in Copenhagen, volume of coverage suffered a sharp decline reflecting a re-
ordering of the political and social priorities in response to the economic crash (and to some 
degree the range of forces which have operated to de-prioritise the need for action). Levels of 
reporting made some recovery in 2014, though TV coverage of that year’s IPCC report was 
again lower than that of previous reports (Painter 2014).  So whilst the Twitter battle rages on 
amongst interested groups online, climate change often receives very little mainstream 
attention at all.    
Audience reception and the commitment to climate change action 
That challenges to mainstream media messages do not routinely penetrate the mainstream 
political and media agenda however that is not to suggest that audiences unthinkingly accept 
the messages that they are receiving.  Indeed the Twitter battle demonstrates that many reject 
them.  Within the circuits model, the way in which audiences negotiate content, including 
acceptance and rejection of the message, is dependent upon a range of different factors.  Prior 
beliefs, values and the range of alternative experiences and knowledge which audiences have 
to draw all play a role in the way in which audiences evaluate media messages (Philo and 
Berry 2004, 2011; Briant et al. 2011; Happer et al. 2012; Philo and Happer 2013).  Returning 
to the question of their dual role, digital media do not simply provide a platform to 
interactively respond to the mainstream, they also support a parallel flow of information, 
which can be consumed in a fairly traditional manner, and which can potentially reinforce the 
latter.  In this section, I will examine the way in which audiences negotiate the range of 
information that they receive on climate change across the range of media that they access.  
This will include consideration of how information is assessed in terms of trust and 
credibility and how it interacts with other beliefs and values to shape attitudes, perceptions 
and ultimately commitments to action on climate change.  In doing so, I will focus on a range 
of research studies conducted by the Glasgow University Media Group between 2011-2015 
(Happer et al. 2012; Philo and Happer 2013; Happer and Philo 2013; Happer and Philo, 
2015) which involved focus groups with audience members from across the UK.  This work 
is contextualised within the substantial body of work looking at public attitudes towards and 
engagement with climate change in the UK and US (Upham et al., 2009; Pidgeon, 2010; 
Whitmarsh et al 2013) which have explored the various factors for shifts and variations such 
as the influence of weather, socio-economic and political factors and media attention (Nisbet 
and Myers, 2007; Pidgeon, 2010; Kahn and Kotchen, 2010;Whitmarsh et al. 2013).  Whilst I 
do not offer a review of this substantial and important body of work, it is worth highlighting a 
general trend in findings since 2007 – which is the reduction in concern and the growth of 
scepticism in the English-speaking world (Pidgeon, 2010; Capstick et al 2014).  This is the 
starting point.   
Awareness, understanding and belief in relation to climate science  
Awareness of climate change is high in the UK; everyone has heard about it.  Across the 
range of GUMG studies, there is some indication that levels of confusion have reduced in 
recent years; in spite of continuing associations with the ozone layer made by a minority, for 
example, in our most recent study, most respondents immediately brought to mind key terms 
such as global warming and greenhouse gases.  Respondents tend to agree that human 
activity contributes to climate change – and those who reject the science outright are in a 
small minority.  Indeed in our most recent study, there was evidence that the sceptical 
position is very much marginalised.  However, across the research, it has become clear that 
scepticism is a difficult thing to measure.  It is perhaps best understood as a spectrum of 
different beliefs, from those who claim climate change isn’t happening, to those who believe 
it is happening but is the result of natural processes, to those who believe human behaviour is 
playing only a limited role.    Even amongst those who state a strong belief in man-made 
climate change, there is a general tendency to question the robustness of the data and/or the 
limitations upon scientific knowledge, as this conversation shows: 
Female respondent: I think especially some of the things that I’ve read about denying 
climate change – you can understand where they are getting that kind of 
understanding from – like,  I can see how they can deny that  it is happening.  
Facilitator: Because the evidence isn’t strong enough or as obvious as you’d like? 
Female respondent: Yeah, because the evidence is kind of like on both sides, climate 
change in many ways, it’s a theoretical thing, and as much is there is proof – it’s 
proof if you want to see it.  (Glasgow, low income group, 2012) 
A further consistent trend, irrespective of levels of belief and awareness, is the lack of 
priority given to climate change.   It is felt to be important, and there is a broad consensus 
that action will have to be taken at some point, but beyond doing their bit by recycling (which 
crucially is structurally supported and publicly encouraged), most don’t feel that strongly.  It 
is secondary to other issues.  Our research confirmed some of the wider findings in relation to 
perceptions of remoteness, temporally and geographically, and being overwhelmed by the 
enormity of global climate change, but it also provided insight into the role of the media, and 
wider communicative processes, in shaping this general disengagement with the issue. 
Negotiating multi-media content on climate change 
In 2006, Henry Jenkins talked of the ‘migratory behaviour’ of media audiences who will go 
almost anywhere in search of the kind of content they want in a re-structuring of the 
hierarchy between audiences and content in which the latter take the lead (Jenkins 2006).  
Certainly our research shows that the more traditional news consumers, those who, for 
example, routinely consume television news in real-time, are outnumbered by audiences who 
engage in a dynamic process of multi-media content negotiation.  However, a critical aspect 
of this process is that mainstream media triggers this process – interest is piqued by news 
outlets, such as the BBC or the Daily Mail online, via mobile alerts or social media posts.  
Where the audience ‘migrates’ to, and the scanning of a range of headlines and the interactive 
discussions which they engage in, tend to follow the mainstream agenda.  This is, in part, 
simply because online interaction needs stimuli and a collective focus.   But a further reason 
for scanning the range of media on any issue is the very low levels of trust in the media and 
mainstream journalism.  Our respondents demonstrated a high sensitivity to the ideological 
bias of different outlets, and therefore the aim was to compare and contrast the range of 
reporting to find consistency, and assess the accuracy of the basic facts and arguments.     
Climate change however is subject to peaks and troughs in media attention, and the issue is 
not top of the mainstream agenda.  The majority are currently not scanning the media for 
more information, or taking part in social media discussion on the subject.   As such, 
interpretations and understandings were drawn from the range of sources that were not 
actively sought on the subject; mainstream news broadcasts, TV documentaries (for example, 
Discovery) the BBC.  Most had ‘pieced together’ an understanding across a period rather 
than actively engaging with the issue.   As a complex scientific issue that most people have 
no direct knowledge of, respondents conceded they were particularly reliant upon the media 
to make sense of it – but it was widely felt that information which was accurate and 
trustworthy was very difficult to find (though most hadn’t looked). There was widespread 
awareness of the battling factions involved in the debate, and in particular of the concerted 
efforts of sceptical groups to penetrate the mainstream.  But even this awareness did not deter 
such reports from constructing a perception of conflict.  Our findings indicated that there was 
a connection between the reinforcement of scepticism and the tendency to see the scientific 
arguments as lacking rigour, and/or the scientists as not wholly consistent.  Scientists were 
largely trusted, and this was not a rejection of the arguments, rather it fuelled a nagging doubt 
in the back of people’s minds about whether to take action – the ‘but what if they’re 
wrong…?’ position.  Our research further suggests that these minor doubts on the legitimacy 
of the science, and the related question of the pressing need to take action, persisted in part 
because they were reinforced by first, perceptions of the democratic process, and the relative 
powerless of individuals within it, and second, the dominant perspectives on current social 
and political priorities and how to achieve them.   
Perceptions of powerlessness and lack of trust 
A key theme in relation to disengagement which emerged across all studies was perceptions 
of powerlessness and a sense of cynicism about the democratic process which ultimately will 
dictate whether action on climate change will be pursued.  This sense of powerlessness was 
rooted in a number of factors.  The first of these was the widespread distrust of public figures, 
primarily politicians, who it was felt would not act in the public interest – some cited the 
expenses scandal and the Leveson inquiry in support of these perceptions.  Most also agreed 
that what politicians promised and what they actually did were often in conflict; 
Male respondent: Yeah, ‘cause we hear a lot of stories now where they way one thing 
and they go back on it… then they give you excuses why… so you think are they really 
going to follow through? (Manchester, student group, 2015) 
Respondents referred to cases of collective action which had been simply ignored such as the 
Iraq war marches – and the background to this, of course, is a Conservative party which 
campaigned in 2010 on promises about ‘the greenest government ever’ and, in office, argued 
to dilute the carbon reduction targets.   
These perceptions led to a general feeling that the democratic process currently does not work 
to represent the will of the people.  Whilst people do not have in-depth knowledge of the 
‘short-circuit’ of negotiations that take place, many have a general sense of a corrupted 
political process in which vested interests take priority over the public good.  Respondents 
felt that they had no power over the decisions that are made.  This perception appeared to be 
particularly strong in younger people – parliamentary politics felt very distant from their 
lives.  It is easy to argue that politicians themselves are responsible for such negative 
perceptions however the role of the media is not negligible here.  The mainstream media is 
responsive to the public sentiment (the feeling that politicians are not to be trusted) but the 
wider demonization of politicians as a collective (what the Daily Mail calls ‘our sneering 
political elite’1) and the often sensationalist personal attacks on politicians exploit and 
exaggerate such sentiment.   In the end, it is the voters alienated from politics who lose – as 
their interests are least likely to be represented in the democratic process.  In the 2015 
                                                          
1 From the column by Dominic Sandbrook, ‘Our sneering political elite and a howl of rage 
that could change politics forever’, Daily Mail, 11th October 2014.   
election, for example, there was strong evidence that the policy commitments of the 
Conservative party most benefitted the older groups who are most likely to vote with the 
younger generations, who tend not to, benefitting least.   
The argument that access to digital media promotes increased participation in the democratic 
process, for example, via public debate and/or information provision, was not supported by 
our findings.  In some ways, these perceptions of powerlessness and lack of trust were further 
exacerbated by the nature of the information environment that audiences are confronted with.   
There is no question that access to the greater range of media messages, and the means to 
interact with them, is largely perceived to be a positive development.  But across all samples, 
respondents noted that they found the attributing of trust in this information environment a 
challenge and there was evidence that the overwhelming range of information to negotiate 
could lead to further disengagement.  As this comment illustrates: 
Female respondent: I think it’s because we’re exposed to so many opinions from 
people and, you know, a lot of the time it is conflicting opinions, you don’t know who 
to believe, so it’s a case of believing nothing instead of believing anything.  (Glasgow, 
middle income group, 2014) 
A further dimension to this was the sense that the information environment is so vast, it is 
very difficult to penetrate.  There is so much information, no one can get heard.  Whilst 
digital media, in theory, offers the potential to penetrate the public debate and shape decision-
making, most respondents felt that currently they had no public voice on important issues.  
The evidence suggests that the shift of media power towards the masses is largely illusory at 
this point.  In the context of limited public debate on and priority given to climate change,  
the lack of public trust in politicians, and wider cynicism about the democratic process, 
including the limited power to shift the terms of the debate, discouraged respondents from 
investing in the  issue themselves.   
Shifting priorities – back to the ‘climate mismatch’ 
The focusing of attention on other issues, such as the economy, and the marginalisation (or 
demonization) of collective solutions to social problems also play a role in fuelling 
disengagement.  As the work of Mike Berry (2012; 2015) has shown, in reflection of shifting 
political priorities since the recession of 2008, reducing the deficit via a programme of 
austerity has dominated reporting whilst other solutions have been marginalised (Happer and 
Philo 2013; Happer 2013; Berry 2015).  In our research conducted early into the Coalition 
government’s leadership, respondents tended to echo the arguments of Osborne, largely 
mirrored in the wider media, that tackling climate change was not compatible with the 
priority of fixing the finances, as this respondent from the 2012 sample noted:   I don’t think 
that the government should be spending a lot of money on this at this time….there are much 
more important things.  Concerns with the economy were raised in all groups, and returning 
to the question of persisting doubt, this female respondent noted that it was not a time for 
risk-taking  
Female respondent:  Pay off the debt first before we pay off stuff that we don’t know 
is making a difference. Realistically we don’t know if it’s making a difference. 
(Norfolk, middle income group, 2012) 
In the wider sense of governments prioritising climate change policies, some went further to 
suggest it would be irresponsible to devote funds to climate change at the current time.   In 
the 2015 research, there was more awareness of the fact that the focus on climate change, and 
the potential solutions involved, were largely at odds with not only public priorities but also 
perceptions of the most effective measures to bring about social change.  This respondent, for 
example, acknowledged that his own reluctance to accept climate change science was rooted 
in an ideological rejection of the kinds of solutions which would have to be taken: 
Male respondent:  There’s quite a big green lobby that would quite like to see certain 
industries, oh, I don’t know, taken down or taxed heavily in favour of other industries 
because they think that’s the answer to everything but I happen to disagree with that 
[]  I feel it’s a bit anti-progress. (London, middle income group, 2015) 
Others noted that society had become too ‘selfish’ and people too focused on their own lives 
(and whether they could afford the new Iphone) – but this reconfiguring of the public as 
primarily consumers was ultimately, if regretfully, accepted as simply the way things are. In 
this sense, those who feel it is foolish to prioritise climate change at this time and those who 
regret that it’s inevitable that we won’t demonstrate the power of media to marginalise the 
possibility of action. 
Public demand for climate change action 
The crucial point however is that it is not inevitable either that climate change won’t be 
tackled successfully by national or international governments or that the current economic 
approach is fixed, and alternatives are not possible.  The periodic shifts in attention to and 
action on climate change, and indeed the passing of the ambitious 2008 UK Change Act, 
discussed earlier in this chapter are evidence that ideas, and the social structures which 
underpin them, can change fairly quickly.  The response to the financial crash of 2008 in 
terms of austerity under a new Coalition government is further evidence.  The very real 
consequences for the public challenged existing belief systems and the political actors and 
media played a role in building a consensus on the correct course of action.  Within the 
circuits model, political and media priorities evolve, and public experience and response play 
a role in that process; they are inter-connected.  While political parties are not perfectly 
responsive to public sentiment; it is an important consideration.   The media is a site of 
competing interests; it shapes the public agenda in response to the range of interest groups 
which feed into production, but it must also connect with what the public think and believe 
too.  Ultimately media products need an audience.  If content on climate change connected 
with a larger audience, levels of reporting would grow.  This would stimulate online debate 
and potentially facilitate the mobilisation of collectives in relation to civil action which 
ultimately politicians would respond to.  Crucially climate change needs to get on the 
electoral agenda.  If, in the current climate, it is difficult to imagine what might stimulate 
such a shift, our research may offer some insights.  As part of our series of studies, we also 
assessed the response to new information on climate change; we found that framings which 
connected with existing concerns and/or brought home the very real and direct consequences 
of climate change made a significant impact.  For example, a constructed TV news report 
showing the potential impact on the number of climate refugees coming to the UK provoked 
a greater level of concern and urgency tapping into common fears about increased levels of 
immigration and the associated problems.  The current situation in Syria is perceived as a 
crisis to which the UK must respond; and the connections with climate change are beginning 
to be made (O’Hagan 2015).  Such circumstances can often act as the catalyst for demands 
for action, which politicians find impossible to ignore.  
Conclusion 
I have argued that the circuit of communication is currently operating in the direction of 
inhibiting action on climate change.  Large corporations, such as the oil and gas industry, 
have direct access to decision-makers, and have also been effective in penetrating the media 
with sceptical viewpoints – though these do not go unchallenged.   The shift in political 
priorities since the financial collapse has seen spending cuts prioritised over public action on 
a range of social issues of which climate change is one, albeit arguably the most important 
one.  This has further led to inconsistent coverage in the media (which follows the 
politicians).   The way in which audiences respond to political and media messages is 
complex but currently there is evidence that the range of content available has promoted 
disengagement with the issue.  In spite of the small group of enthusiasts online, digital media 
has not shifted the mainstream agenda, and has operated to reinforce this response.  This 
disengagement results partly from the belief that the issue won’t be prioritised, and also 
because focusing on the economy seems like the common sense thing to do.  However, the 
media is also a site of competing interests, and it is here that the potential for change may lie.   
Hope may, for example, lie in recent collective action such as the divestment movement 
which has emerged across university campuses worldwide and which has had some success 
but unlimited potential. Such movements are crucial in shifting the perception that collectives 
can drive change – currently a central obstacle to the drive to action that is becoming so 
urgent on climate change.   
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